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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
Effie Cole, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
-vs-
Fred J. Kloepfer, Elden J. 
Kloepfer, and Ronald V. 
Butters, doing business in the 
Firm name of Kloepfer Sand & 
Gravel Co., 
Defendants & Respondents. 
Case No. 7897 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State ot Utah, in and for 
the County of Cache. 
Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judge 
\; 1 L 11, ~ib-··-~.;-.~~o_,:t£nlly submitted, 
..... .. t\l- ) . ~~\ ~f,,l~' 
'.\· '-) \j -~ s· ,.:;~~: ;;_ H~tvey A. Sjostrom 
. _____ ---*-- --r'"""""t: ..... ~i.~torney for Plaintiff 
-- -- - ---- cou ' \J 
- - , .-.r<;t.\le A 11 
·-, .:e .. .-k, ~~"'"" ppe ant. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
Effie Cole, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
-vs-
Fred J. Kloepfe!, Elden J. 
Kloepfer, and Ronald V. 
Butters, doing business in the 
Firm name of Kloepfer Sand & 
Gravel Co., 
Defendants & Respondents. 
Case No. 7897 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST.A.TEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises out of judgment of dismissal 
with prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case. 
The plaintiff in this case is a woman 75 years of age 
(R 34) who was walking west on the north side of Third 
South Street, Logan, Utah on or about the 8th day of 
October, 1949, at about 5 p.m. of said day, when at 
about 263 East on said Third South Street, she caught 
the toe of her shoe on an abrupt rise in the sidewalk 
causing her to trip and break her knee cap in 3 or 4 
places, (R 35, 36). 
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Plaintiff lived at 163 East on said Third South 
Street and was familiar with the defect (R 35). At the 
time of the accident the plaintiff had stepped onto the 
"center piece" (R 35) (R 36) which consisted of a 
block of cement sidewalk that had previously been 
torn up as part of the sidewalk in order to put in 
water and sewer lines at a house lying on the north 
side of said walk (R 22). This cement block formed 
part of the refill in backfilling said trench and was 
about 3 inches above the surrounding back-fill (R 24), 
and about in the center of the ten foot by 5 foot 
sidewalk that had been taken out (R 23). There were 
other cement blocks also that had been used in the 
backfilling which also protruded above the surrounding 
dirt and gravel (R 24). The dirt and gravel was left 
about lYz inches below the abutting pavement at the 
time of the backfill (R 24). That the condition con-
tinued to exist until the time of the accident except 
that the dirt settled somewhat (R 25). That prior 
to the excavation it "was all good cement like it 
ought to be" (R 34). 
Plaintiff testified (and there was no evidence to 
the contrary) that as she stepped on the said "center 
piece" there was a car passing awfully fast and just 
about then there were some children down the block, 
and they let out an awful yell and I naturally looked 
up to see if they were run over or hurt. I tripped my 
toe on this high place going up onto the good sidewalk. 
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I broke my knee cap in three or four places" (R 36). 
Thereafter and until the thne of the trial she had to 
use crutches or cane in order to get around (R 37). 
It was stipulated by counsel that the doctor would 
testify that plaintiff would be incapacitated for life 
because of the injury sustained (R 59). It may be 
added that she was alert to the condition of the side-
walk at the time she started- across the rough and 
uneven portion in question (R 36). 
The defendants admit in their pleading that they 
dug and backfilled the trench in question but allege 
it was done in a careful manner (R 6). However, when 
plaintiff's husband first saw _the backfill the dirt was 
still soft and the cement blocks were somewhat em-
bedded in the soft dirt. This was, as he figured it, 
about 2 days after the work was done (R 22). That 
right after the backfill the cement block was seen 
''sticking up there'' and the big block was about 10 
or 12 inches square,- which was ·either the· day of the 
completion of the job or the morning of the next day 
(R 5, 51, 52, 53). No permit, as was required by 
Logan City Ordinance, was taken out for the digging 
of the trench as the record shows no proof of the same. 
The complaint alleges that the defendants back-
filled the said trench so as to leave a public nuisance 
(R 1). The evidence adduced, and as above outlined 
shows that this is the case under the laws of the State 
of Utah. l\ public nuisance, as defined by section 103-
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41-3 Utah Revised Statutes, 1943, reads: "A public 
nuisance consists in the unlawful doing of any act, or 
omitting to perform any duty which act or omission 
either, 1, Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, 
repose, health or safety of three or more persons, or 
2. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or renders 
dangerous for passage any lake, stream, canal or basin 
or any public park, street or highway.'' 
On motion for dismissal at the time of the trial, 
plaintiff asked the Court on what ground it placed 
or would place the dismissal and the Court said on the 
ground of contributory negligence of the plaintiff (R 
59, 60). It thereafter, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
evidence dismissed the action with prejudice (R 66) and 
entered judgment accordingly (R 10). However, in the 
Findings the Court below enlarges upon the cause for 
dimissal by adding that any act done by the defendants 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and 
as eonclusions of law the Court bases it's dismissal also 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove 
it was the defendants duty to maintain the sidew:alk in 
a safe condition (R 8, 9). And in it's judgment of dis-
missal ~ the Court reiterates these grounds of dis-
missal (R 10). 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBU-
TORILY NEGLIG:BJNT. 
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POINT 2 
THE COlTRrr, ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF L.A. \\T 1"HAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS, OR ANY OF THEIR 
EMPLOYEES WERE GUILTY OF ANY ACT OR 
~-\CTS WHICH WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
O:B., THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFF'S CON-
SEQUENT INJURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAw THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTOR-
ILY NEGLIGENrr. 
That there was negligence on the part of the defen-
dants in backfilling the trench that had pr~viously been 
dug by them across the sidewalk is not ·open to/ doubt. 
rrhe record of the testimony submitted to the Court 
below shows that the cement.. sidewalk for a distance 
of 10 feet in length and ·five feet in width was taken up 
(R 23), and that there was left as the result of backfill-. 
ing an extremely rough and uneven surface in that 
there was a drop of from lYz to 3 inches from the abutt-
ing pavement as found by the Court below. Added to 
this there 'vas one large block of cement that was left 
protruding upward about 3 inches from the immediate 
surrounding ground of the backfill together with other 
smaller pieces of block cement (R 24). That the con-
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dition ren1ained about the same until the time of the 
accident ( 25) . 
. Keeping , these facts in mind can anyone doubt but 
what this condition was a public nuisance as defined 
by our statutes heretofor quoted, the same being created 
and maintained by the defendants and in violation of 
the Logan City Ordinance quoted in plaintiff's com-
plaint. 
The question then seems to be whether or not the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law even though she had many times prior to the time 
of the accident and injury passed over or near the rough 
and uneven backfilling and knew of it's existence and 
was aiert to it at the very time she attempted to 
pass over it on the 8th day of October~ 
The cases so far as we have been able to ascertain 
. 
hold that such a person is not guilty ·?f contributory 
negligence. It will be remembered that at the time she 
attempted to cross some children were in the street 
· west of plaintiff, that a fast moving automobile was 
. going west, · the same direction as the plaintiff, and 
that said children yelled and said plaintiff thought 
one or more of them had been injured and therefore 
loo~ed up (R 36). That she was distracted from the 
rough place in question, we believe is established for 
sh~ was startled ( R 61). Would not a;nyone be startled 
and distracted under these circumstances~ We believe 
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they "rould . 
... \s to "rhether or not one Is contributory negligent 
under the facts of this case is one of fact to be passed 
on by the jury. Smith vs. City of Tacoma, 163 Wash. 
626, 1 Pac. (2) 870, 871 i~ a case in point. There the 
plaintiff 'Yas familiar with the hazardous place in the 
walk prior to the accident. In this case the defendant 
contended that they should have judgment nqtwith-
standing the verdict of the jury, but the Supreme Court 
of Washington refused, saying: 
"~~he mere fact that the appellant was aware 
of the defective condition· .of the sidewalk when 
the accident occurred is not per se conclusive of 
negligence on his part, though it was competent 
evidence on the question of contributory negli-
gence.*** All that the law required was the ex-
ercise of such care and caution as a person of 
ordinary prudence would rise under similar cir-
cumstances. '' 
we do not believe that defendants can find a well 
considered case that prior knowledge of defect alone 
is· sufficient to charge or hold plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence when there is such a distraction 
as oecured in the instant case. And we maintain that 
the case of Eisner vs. Salt Lake City, 238 Pac. (2) 416 
does not so hold, but holds that there was not such 
an unusual distraction as to absolve her from such a 
charge nor 'vas the plaintiff in that case alert to her 
immediate surro~ndings. 
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In the case of Denton vs. Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35, 
28 Pac. (2) 202, 203 we have a case pertaining to a 
·rough and uneyen sidewalk. Plaintiff in response tD 
questions answered thus: 
'' ' Q. Yes, You had the two young ladies 
with you, and you knew that this place was very 
dangerous; but you were not paying very much 
attention to the girls; and yet you think you must 
have forgotten about that place~ Is that correct~ 
· A. Well, I had crossed over the place a number 
of times and had got kind of used to going over 
it; yet I knew that anyone had to take especial 
care in going over that place without stumbling 
and falling.' 
" 'Q~ And what happened when you got up 
in the immediate vicinity of this 812 Fourth 
Avenue West, Mr. Denton~ A. Well, I was just 
walking along there and I carne up by No. 812, 
and there was some boys out there in the yard 
playing and holloring, and just as I went to 
pass over this break'one of them yelled out, and 
it kind of startled me .and I looked around to 
.see what was gqi~g on, and the . thing that I 
next knew I was getting up.' 
" 'Q. Well, what I am trying to get at, Mr. 
Denton, what was the reason that you lost your 
footing and fell~ A. Well, I stumped my foot 
over this broken place there in the walk and fell.' 
'' 'Q. Now, you stated to your counsel, in 
answer to a question that there was some outcry 
or some yell from some of the children playing 
in a yard nearby. Do you remember that' A. 
Yes, sir. ' " · 
As in the instant case the defendant requested a 
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nonsuit whieh "Tas denied and on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Idaho, the Court there said : 
''Touching the question of temporary forget-
fulness, in another 'sidewalk' case, Butland v. 
Caldwell, 51 Idaho, 483, 488, 6 P. (2nd) 493, 496, 
this court expressed itself as follows: 'Tempor-
ary forgetfulness, inattention, or distraction do 
not generally constitute contributory negligence. 
'When a person has exercised t~e care and cau-
tion which an ordinarly prudent person would 
have exercised under the same or similar cir-
cumstances, he is not negligent merely· because 
he temporarily forgot or was inattentive to a 
known danger'. 45 C.J. 950, and! authorities cited. 
Ordinary care is all that is required. 45 C.J. 947, 
949, and authorities cited. Osier v. Consumers' 
Co., 42 Idaho, 789, 796, 248 P. 438; Giffen v. ·City 
of Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 231, 55 P. 545.' '' 
In Cox vs. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kansas 392, 110 
Pac. (2) 772, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by 
a lower court which had sustained a demurrer to plain-
tiff's complaint. Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk 
and when he~ came alongside of the hole· in the sidewalk 
into which he fell, he met one Moore carrying an arm-
load of groceries. 1\ioore passed plaintiff so close that 
plaintiff fell into the hole. There was no evidence that 
~ioore bu1nped plaintiff into the hole, but only that he 
passed close to plaintiff and plaintiff stepped aside to 
avoid a collision and fell into the hole. At the time plain-
tiff was living within 40 feet of the hole, knew of its 
existence fro1n the many times that he had walked 
along the sidev.ralk, and immediately prior to meeting 
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him, was walking to the side of the hole. The Kansas 
Court stated the general principle that the mere know-
ledge on the part of the plaintiff did not conclusively 
show contributory negligence, and then cited an earlier 
case entitled City of Olathe vs. Mizee, 48 Kan. 
435, 29 P. 754, 3 Am. ·st. Rep. 308, which set forth 
the principle and general rule that a person whose 
faculties of observa~ion or memory are temporarily 
distracted as regards a dangerous condition is virtually 
in the same rnental position as .one who has never acquir-
ed knowledge of such dangerous condition. Plaintiff sub-
Inits that the Cox case sets forth sound, applicable 
principles of law and should be adopted by this court 
and made the law of Utah. 
In the support of the general principle, the Kansas 
Court cites 13 A.L.R. 87, wherein excuses for failure 
to observe and a void defect or obstruction is annotated. 
Three basic cases set forth the principle and are cited 
in the annotation. ·They are: Thomas v. New York, 28 
Hun.( N.Y.) 110; Barr v. Fairfax, 156 Mo. App. 295, 
137 S.W. 631; Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N.W. 
314. 
In Thon1as v. New York, it was ruled that a person 
'vhose attention was diverted from a dangerous condi-
tion by a crowd was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence as ·n1atter of law. 
In Barr v. Fairfax the approach of another person 
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diverted plaintiff' 8 attention from the defect. 
In I~enyon v . .Jiondovi the pedestrian's atte.ntion was 
diverted by being accosted by a friend. 
Three California eases 'vhich "involve somewhat sim-
jlar facts and 'vhich applied the principle . for which 
plaintiff here contends are Barry v. Terkildsen 72 Cal. . 
25":!:, 13 P. 657, 40 P. 555 ; \'"an Praag v. ?-ale, 107 Cal. 438; 
De \Tal v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria So., 45 Cal,App 377, 
187 P. 767. 
In Barry v. Terkildsen plaintiff's attention was at-
tracted to some children playing in the street at the 
1non1ent she stepped into the open hole. The court held 
that she 'vas not guilty of contributory negligence as 
Inatter of law. 
In Van Praag v. Gale plaintiff was reading a news-
paper and walked into an open doorway. The question 
of contributory negligence was again ruled as one of 
fact for the jury to decide. 
In Du \Tal v. Broos Bros. Cafteria Co. plaintiff 
fell into an open elevator shaft at a time when her 
attention was attracted to something she was passing 
on the highway. Again the question of contributory 
negligence 'vas properly submitted to the jury. At page 
769 the court sets forth the following interesting statc-
Inent of fact and principles applicable: 
''In the present case the respondent testi-
fied that when 10 or 12 feet from the elevator 
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doors she saw they were closed. Her attention be-
ing attracted to something she was passing, she 
turned her head, and as she walked that short 
distance, one of the doors was rai$ed from the 
pitfall directly in her pathway and into which 
she fell . · 
As was said in the optnion in Van Praag v. Gale: 
" 'To some minds probably the conclusion 
would seem irresistible that he who, with eyes 
to see, in broad daylight walks into an . open 
trapdoor in the sidewalk is lacking in that care 
and caution which charactrize the man of ordin-
ary prudence. Others may well reason that plain-
tiff was entitled to a safe passage over a walk 
prepared by the public for the accomodation of 
all its citizens.' 
''The fact that different minds might reach 
different conclusions upon the question of the 
respondent's caution disposes of all the conten-
tions of the appellants based on the assumption 
that contributory negligence was shown as a 
matter of law, as well as their contentions re-
garding the instructions on the subject given 
and refused. Mere abstraction on the part of a 
pedistrian does not constitute contributory neg-
ligence. Robinson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 461; Perkins 
v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 722, 103 Pac. 
190. Th question of contributory negligeRce wa~ 
properly submitted to the jury under correct 
instructions. ' ' 
Numerous other cases which discussed other types 
of distractions and 'vhich hold that such distractions are 
sufficient to make a jury question on the matter of con-
tributory negligence are cited and discussed at 70 A.L.R. 
1388. 
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It will thus be seen from the above authorities that 
in cases such as the in8tant one the question of contri-
butory negligence is one for the JUry. 
POINT 2 
THE COlTRT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 'rHAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, 
THAT THE DEFENDANT, OR ANY OF THEIR 
E~iPLOYEES, WERE GUILTY OF ANY ACT OR 
.A.CTS WHICH WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT AND CONSEQUENT INJURY. 
In the judgment (R 10) the Court below laid down 
this ruling but in the conclusions of Law (R 9) the 
Court held that plaintiff was precluded from recovery 
for failure to establish by any evidence a duty on part 
of the defendants at the time and place of accident to 
maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition. 
Of course it is not plaintiff's contention that if 
the defendants had backfilled as required by the Logan 
City Ordinance as set out in our pleading and as proved, 
and had not created a public nuisance, that if the side-
walk thereafter became in disrepair through no fault 
of defendants that they would be liable. But we do con-
tend that defendants having created a public nuisance 
as the record sho\vs, it was their duty to obviate the 
same and as they did not so do they are liable under 
the facts of this cause to plaintiff. 
As has been pointed out in our statement of facts 
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and which is substantiated by the record the defen-· 
dants after digging the trench backfilled it by the use 
of a bulldozer leaving in the center of the back-
fill a cement block 10 by 12 inches in dimension 
and which was about 3 inches above the surrounding 
soil and gravel (R23) with smaller protruding blocks 
of cement surrounding the large one (R24). And as 
has been shown this condition was shown to exist 
up to the time of the accident (R25). Plaintiff's husband 
saw this condition 2 days after it's creation (R22) and 
witness Sjoberg saw it the same day of it's creation or 
the next morning (R50, 51, 52, 53). That a past condi-
tion may be inferred from proof of a present condition 
in a case as this one will not, we believe, be controverted 
for this is the law laid down in 31 C.J.S. pp. 790, 
Sec. 140 with numerous citations. 
The record fails to disclose that a permit was taken · 
out for the digging of said trench and consequently the 
s~ia'' digging was in violation of positive law which 
is in and of itself negligence. See Millsp~ugh v. Alert 
Transfer & Storage Co., 259 Pac. 22, 23, 145 Washington 
111. It constitutes negligence per se. See Central Rail-
road & B. Co., v. Srnith, 3 S.E. 397. Kavanagh v. Ne·w 
York & W. Ry. Co., 187 N.Y. 859, 860 196, App. Div. 384. 
That the condition created bythe defendants and allowed 
to remain constituted a public nuisance we believe is 
well proven for as has been noticed plaintiff herself 
would sometimes go around the place due to it's rough-
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ness and hazardous condition ( R35). ...t\.nd other people 
had also had falls at the sa1ne place because of said 
condition there existing (R31, 32). 
It 'vas held in the case of Christie v. Mutual Grocery 
Co., 194 .A .. 225, 227, 119 N.J. La'v 147, that any obstruc-
tion unnecessarily impeding the la,vful use of a street 
by the public 'vas a nuisance 'vhich would render creator 
liable for accident resulting therefrom. 
As has been heretofore noted the uneven and rough 
surface of the backfill was first noticed by the plain-
tiff's husband within two days after the backfill and was 
also seen by witness Sjobreg, who, by the way, was 
the owner of the property for which the trench was dug, 
the evening of its completion or the next morning. The 
inference is therefore inexcapable that the condition was 
so left by the defendants and the Court below so found 
(R8, 9). The fact that the Court found as a conclusion 
that the same did not constitute a public nuisance is 
entirely at variance with the. finding of fact by the 
court for it found that, ''at one place was below the 
surface of the abutting walk approximately 2 or 3 
inches." That conclusion is certainly at variance with 
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and there was 
nothing in the record to the contrary. That the rough 
condition created by the negligence of defendants was 
the approximate cause of accident and injury is we be-
lieve well established. However, we are of the opinion 
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that the defendants are estopped from raising point no. 2 
here set forth for they did not raise it as grounds for 
dismissal and or stated before the court placed the 
dismissal on the sole ground of contributory negligence 
at the trial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should 
1·everse the decision of the trial court and remand the 
plaintiff's cause of action to the District Court for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Appellant. 
153 North Main, Logan, Utan 
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